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Summary. The traditional way of protecting networks and applications with e.g.,
ﬁrewalls and encryption, is no longer suﬃcient to protect eﬀectively emerging hybrid
wired-cum-wireless networks including ad hoc networks. Intrusion detection mecha-
nisms should be coupled with preventive measures so as to identify unauthorised abuses.
To this end, we propose a novel Hybrid Distributed Security Operation Center (HD-
SOC) which collects logs that are generated by any application/service, layer of the
protocol stack or resource (e.g., router), providing a global view of the supervised sys-
tem based on which complex and distributed intrusions can be detected. Our HDSOC
further (i) distributes its capabilities and (ii) provides extensive coordination capa-
bilities for guarantying that both the networks and the HDSOC components do not
constitute isolated entities largely unaware of each others.
Keywords: Distributed intrusion detection, host-based and network intrusion detec-
tion, security and protection management, event notiﬁcation.
1 Introduction
Until recently, most systems were operating over wired networks and were in-
tended to be used as part of speciﬁc applications or in localised settings (e.g.,
building, campus or corporation). Spurred by the emergence of Wiﬁ technologies
and the advance of generalised eCommerce and pervasive applications (e.g., res-
cue andmilitary application), interest has moved towards the provision of a global
solution that interconnects in a secure manner changing sets of clients, services
and networks. This construction of Internet-scale applications introduces new
challenges consisting in securing large-scale wired-cum-wired networks, includ-
ing Wiﬁ-enabled ad hoc networks, which are spanning geographically dispersed
sites and distinct administrative domains. The traditional way of protecting these
networks and applications with e.g., ﬁrewalls and encryption is no longer suﬃ-
cient due to the following reasons. First, ad hoc networks introduce security holes
due to their vulnerability to a variety of factors e.g., open medium, cooperative
algorithms. In addition, the best protection is always vulnerable to attacks due
to unknown security bugs and improper conﬁguration. It is therefore clear that
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preventive measures should be coupled with intrusion detection mechanisms so as
to identify unauthorised use and abuse. The Distributed Network Intrusion De-
tection Systems (DNIDSs) that have been proposed in the literature [1] [2], are
extremely diverse in the mechanisms they employ to gather, analyse data and
identify intrusion. However, DNIDSs share in common the fact that they glean
intrusion data by monitoring the traﬃc and intercepting the network communi-
cations. More speciﬁcally, they mostly operate on the IP and transport layer head-
ers and packets as well as the packet content, providing in depth packet analysis.
Consequently, while DNIDSs are in a very convenient position wherein it has a
complete access to all traﬃc traversing the managed network, their perspicacities
suﬀer from:
• the cost (in term of processing usage) associated with the in depth analysis
of the intercepted traﬃc. Note that one class of attacks commonly launched
against DNIDS, lies in letting this DNIDS in a lethal state by spamming it
with a large number of spurious traﬃc.
• the absence of information owned by the DNIDS on resources (hosts, services,
protocols and applications) that constitute the network, which renders the
DNIDS impotent to detect, correlate and report a wide range of (host, service,
protocol and application-speciﬁc) intrusions.
This ineﬃciency of actual DNIDSs engaged us to propose a novel approach
to intrusion detection, which were based on a Distributed Security Operation
Center (DSOC)[6, 7]. Rather than relying exclusively on a resource-consuming
and prone to attack traﬃc monitoring system, our DSOC collects logs that are
generated by any application, service, DNIDS, layer of the protocol stack or
resource (e.g., router) composing the managed system. As a result, our DSOC
owns a global view of the supervised system - the state of any component being
reported - based on which it can detect complex intrusions that are possibly
originated by any component of the protocol/application stack and any hardware
resource.
Based on this preliminary work, we propose a novel Hybrid DSOC (HDSOC)
which is dedicated to provide intrusion detection in a large-scale hybrid network
built upon wired-cum-wireless networks, which are geographically-dispersed and
include Wiﬁ-based ad hoc networks. Our HDSOC takes into account the speci-
ﬁcities of ad hoc networks:
• Wireless hosts may operate under severe constraints e.g., limited bandwidth.
This requires deﬁning an HDSOC that reduces the overhead caused by its
usage.
• The dynamics of hybrid networks including ad hoc networks, diminish the
resilience of the HDSOC and necessitates to increase the decoupling of the
HDSOC components so as to enable this latter to react and reconﬁgure in a
timely way to network dynamics.
All these factors circumvent the need for supporting a global low-overhead HD-
SOC that is adapted to the network topology and characteristics (e.g., its dy-
namics, organisation) as well as the medium of communication which may be
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e.g., unreliable and subject to unexpected disconnection. In order to increase the
resilience of the HDSOC, we propose to (i) distribute its capabilities and (ii) pro-
vide extensive coordination capabilities for guarantying that both the networks
and the HDSOC components do not constitute isolated entities largely unaware
of each others. The proposed security operation center collects logs for detec-
tion and correlation without consuming signiﬁcant network bandwidth while
addressing missing, conﬂicting, bogus, and overlapping data. Further support
for dynamic reassign correlation, and intrusion detection management responsi-
bilities is provided to nodes as the topology evolves. The remainder of this paper
is organised as follows. We introduce the proposed Distributed Security Opera-
tion Center (§ 2) before detailing each of its constitutive component (§ 3). Then,
we conclude this paper with a summary of our results along with directions for
future works (§ 4).
2 Design Rational
HDSOC aims to detect intrusion in a hybrid network composed of a collection of
ad hoc networks which either (i) operate in physically isolated geographic sites
(e.g., disaster-aﬀected areas) or (ii) extend the coverage of e.g., public hot-spots,
corporate buildings or large-scale urban areas. Each of these geographically dis-
persed ad hoc networks is further connected to a (wired) wide area network
thanks to some gateway nodes (see Figure 1 for an overview of the network and
the HDSOC architecture).
Fig. 1. HDSOC Architecture
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The main challenge in collecting logs in ad hoc networks stems from the need
to minimise the generated traﬃc and the computational load. This calls for:
1. parsing logs (i.e., extract only relevant data) rather than collecting raw logs
that are characterised by a large size and prone to overload our system (as
it is the case with attacks on the log size),
2. enabling resource-constrained devices that are incapable of parsing locally
their logs, to delegate this parsing activity to a remote device which oﬀers
suﬃcient capabilities.
3. parsing logs as close as close as possible from the device that generates it so
as to diminish the number of long distant communications.
In order to answer to these commitments, our approach lies in collecting and
parsing logs locally whenever possible. For this purpose, a lightweight collector
and parsing agent (hereafter referred as Embedded Collection Box or simply
ECBox) is embedded on the devices that show suﬃcient memory and comput-
ing resources. Alternatively, for resource-constrained nodes, we rely on a service
discovery protocol (§3.4), which discovers dynamically ECBoxes. Among poten-
tial candidates, the closest ECBox is selected so as to keep to a minimum long
distance communication. The selected ECBox is further assigned the task of col-
lecting and parsing logs on behalf of resource-constrained devices. After parsing
and extracting relevant data from logs, local/remote ECBoxes generate event
notiﬁcations that are further disseminated over the network, causing a slight
increase of the network traﬃc due to the lightweight size of event notiﬁcations.
The dissemination of events is performed by an event notiﬁcation service which
aims to ensure that each device is delivered the information (i.e., events) relating
to the distributed intrusion to which that devices participates. This information
gives to the device a global view of the intrusion (i.e., intrusion state, intru-
sion development and its level of implication), helping it in reporting in early
stage any intrusion furtherance. In order to prevent the device from ﬂooding
the network whenever an intrusion is reported while providing to the devices
a global view of the intrusion attempts to which it takes part, we rely on a
publish/subscribe distributed event notiﬁcation service whereby:
• consumers (e.g., devices taking part in the intrusion attempt, security admin-
istrator’s computer) express their demands to producers (e.g., devices taking
part in the intrusion) during a subscription process,
• event producers transfer to subscribers the description of any relevant event
that has been triggered locally.
This event system faces the requirements (namely scalability, autonomy and
timeliness) driven by HDSOC by disseminating in a distributed way events over
a self-conﬁgured delivery structure organised as a cluster-based hierarchy
(Figure 3). This cluster-based hierarchy provides convenient aggregation and cor-
relation points while rending our HDSOC more adaptable to network failures and
less vulnerable to attacks due to its distributed nature.
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3 Distributed Operation Center for Hybrid Networks
We propose an hybrid distributed security operation center which attempts to
detect intrusions within a large-scale network including geographically-dispersed
wired or wireless networks (e.g., ad hoc networks). Such detection necessitates to
collect logs (§3.1) so as to identify intrusion attempts (§3.2) and initiate proper
reactions. Rather than collecting bandwidth-consuming raw logs, our approach
lies in parsing logs so as to extract only security-relevant information and gen-
erate compact event notiﬁcations and alarms that are beside disseminated at
low cost (§ 3.3). Note that such parsing is either performed locally, i.e., on the
device that generated the logs if its capacities are suﬃcient) or alternatively re-
motely; such delegation of the parsing task being enabled by a pervasive service
discovery protocol (§ 3.4).
3.1 Local Event Collection
Prior developing mechanisms for detecting intruders, it is crucial to understand
the nature of attacks1 as well as the possible security holes that characterise ad
hoc and hybrid networks. In ad hoc networks, intruders take advantage of the
lack of physical protection inherent to the absence of clear physical boundary
(no protection being applied inside the network by any layer 3 resources, e.g.,
gateways), the collaborative nature of algorithms and the resource-limited ca-
pacity of the network (devices being more likely to be exhausted). This renders
network components particularly vulnerable. These components include:
• Networking components (e.g., MAC, zeroconf and routing protocols) included
in the physical/link/network layers are subject to eavesdropping, jamming,
interceptions (physical layer), identity falsiﬁcation (zeroconf protocol) and
ﬁnally attacks initiated on routing tables (routing protocol) with e.g., the
so-called wormhole and blackhole attacks.
• Security components, including DNIDS, cryptographic facilities, motivation
functionalities which recompense collaborative nodes, and reputation and
exclusion mechanisms whereby nodes vote and attribute a reputation to each
node.
• Transport components, applications and services which are aﬀected by session
hijacking or ﬂooding and application/service/scenario-speciﬁc attacks.
Each of these software components generates logs expressed in diﬀerent formats
including standard formats (e.g., syslog,MIB,HTML) or proprietary/application-
speciﬁc formats. These logs can be easily collected relying on standard Xmit
protocols (e.g., SNMP, SMTP,HTTP) as it is the case in traditionalmonitoring ar-
chitectures. For instance, OLSR [5, 4] logs can be collected using MIB format that
is deﬁned and used in [8, 9]. The pervasiveness of these protocols ensures a signiﬁ-
cant level of interoperability to our HDSOC despite the heterogeneity of hardware
1 Interest reader can refer to [12] for a comprehensive survey on attacks and counter-
measures in ad hoc networks.
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Fig. 2. Device Architecture
and software platforms.We therefore consider a HDSOC in which each device gen-
erates logs whose collection is enabled thanks to a protocol agent. In practice, this
protocol agent corresponds to a collection of clients which implement standard
Xmit protocols (Figure 2). Collecting logs from heterogeneous sources implies
setting up a dispatcher and an application agent. The dispatcher determines the
source-type of an incoming event and then forward it to the appropriate applica-
tion agent which formats it in a common format (i.e., a format understandable by
any HDSOC module). In practice, this dispatcher performs the following tasks:
• listening for incoming message transmitted by a protocol agent through an
particular channel (e.g., as socket, named pipe, system V message queue),
• identifying the message source and the Xmit protocol used. More precisely,
a patterns database is pre-loaded in the device memory (for performance
considerations) and is used to ﬁnd patterns matching the message.
• redirecting the original message to the application agent responsible for man-
aging the messages generated by that type of source and Xmit protocol.
This application agent parses the message and expresses it in a common format
that is transmitted to the event notiﬁcation agent.
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3.2 Distributed Intrusion Detection
After translating events into a common format that is understandable by any
DSOC component, events are analysed and correlated so as to avoid transmit-
ting all the events across the network. The main objective of correlation lies
in producing a succinct overview of security-related activities. This necessitates
to (i) ﬁlter events for the purpose of extracting only relevant events, and (ii)
aggregate events so as to generate a compact representation of those events that
eases the intrusion detection. Broadly sketched, event ﬁltering aims to eliminate
events that are not relevant, i.e.,
• duplicate events that do not provide additional information while consuming
signiﬁcant bandwidth.
• events that match policy criteria e.g., administrator login, identiﬁcation, au-
thorisation or restriction processes.
• events that are not critical to the supervised system, excluding events that re-
late to some vulnerabilities whose system is not exposed to. For this purpose,
the device stores and maintains (structural, functional and topology-related)
information about security breaches and insecure behaviour that either im-
pact the overall security level or that can be exploited by an attacker.
Relevant events (i.e., events that went thought the ﬁltering pipe) are further
aggregated so as to provide a more concise view of what is happening in the sys-
tem. This actual system view called context is stored locally with the previously
generated contexts, before being transmitted by the event notiﬁcation service.
Based on the collection of contexts owned by the device, intrusion detection may
take place. Intrusion detection consists in analysing a sequence of events so as
to identify event sequence patterns characterising intrusion attempt. Note that
during this process, time considerations are taken into account so as to take into
account slow intrusions. In practice, such intrusion detection consists in match-
ing a sequence of events (a context) against a set of attack signatures whose
structure is described bellow.
Attack signature
A conquering attack can be broken down into a collection of successive steps that
are successfully completed. This renders an attack characterisable as an attack
signature, which corresponds to a labelled tree rooted by a node representing
the goal, and intermediate nodes representing an attack step (i.e., an observable
event) with a succession of children deﬁning a way of achieving it. An attack
scenario (i.e., the overall set of attacks that can threat the supervised system) is
then represented as a forest of trees, with some part of trees being shared when
a subset of steps involved in two distinct attacks is similar. Such attack scenarios
are deﬁned by the security administrator based on vulnerabilities speciﬁc to the
network and the past attacks. Such tree-based representation of attack signa-
tures renders intrusion detection easy to carry out. Indeed, an attack attempt is
easily identiﬁable by matching attack signatures against a context, i.e., against a
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succession of (possibly distributed) events occurring on a speciﬁc set of systems
(e.g. devices, collection of devices, network segments). From a practical point
of view, an attack identiﬁcation therefore consists in matching an attack signa-
ture on the instance of a particular context. Central to intrusion identiﬁcation is
therefore the context accuracy. This accuracy is maintained by the event notiﬁ-
cation service, which updates the context of each device (its system view) with
the most up-to-date events arising in the network.
3.3 Distributed Event Notiﬁcation
Our event notiﬁcation service aims to deliver events to devices so as to enable
them to update their context, giving that device a global view of the intrusion
attempts and hence rending the detection of intrusions more accurate. In order
to prevent the device from blindly ﬂooding the network whenever an intrusion
is reported, our event model derives from the asynchronous publish/subscribe
paradigm. From a communication perspective, our distributed event notiﬁcation
consists in exchanging notiﬁcations and control messages (i.e., subscriptions and
un-subscriptions) between producers and subscribers through a collection of in-
termediate event agents (Figure 1). Note that a potential event agent (hereafter
simply called agent) designates a device which holds our notiﬁcation service. In
practice, this collection of intermediate agents is organised into a cluster-based
structure wherein each agent corresponds is a cluster leader and maintains in-
formation and connectivity with its cluster members and its clusterhead2. This
underlying structure is then used for delivering control messages (subscriptions
and un-subscriptions) to producers, as well as notiﬁcations to consumers. When
delivering a notiﬁcation, the main objective pursued by agents lies in forward-
ing that notiﬁcation to an agent only if, toward this direction, there exists a
consumer interested in receiving it. For the purpose of forwarding selectively no-
tiﬁcations, each agent holds a subscription repository that includes each received
subscription along with the respective neighbouring agent which forwarded it.
Note that a neighbouring router constitutes the potential candidate for forward-
ing notiﬁcations. This repository is used to deﬁne if there exists a consumer along
the direction of the considered router that subscribed for this notiﬁcation. Based
on this event notiﬁcation, security information can be eﬃciently disseminated to
the HDSOC.
Event notiﬁcation Delivery Structure
In order to support an eﬃcient event dissemination over a hybrid network, we
propose a distributed event system, which distinguishes itself by:
• providing seamless integrated event notiﬁcation over a network composed
of diﬀerent types of networking technologies (wired versus wireless,
infrastructure-less versus infrastructure-based networks) and possibly span-
ning geographically dispersed domains/sites.
2 The root of the delivery structure maintains information restricted to its cluster
member.
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• addressing the problem relating to the support of extensive control, secu-
rity and autonomy by mean of a distributed event notiﬁcation system based
on a overlay infrastructure, which organise the nodes for delivering event
notiﬁcations.
In practice, in order to distribute the events management, we based our event
notiﬁcation system on a distributed grouping communication which organises
nodes into a self-organised delivery structure (Figure 3) deployed of the hybrid
network, as deﬁned in [3]. This structure corresponds to a cluster-based hierarchy
of nL layers (nL=log(nn), with nn designating the number of nodes that are
expected to join the event system), each layer being portioned into a set of
bounded-size clusters (let k be that size) controlled by a cluster head. The reason
for setting bounds on the number of layers and on the cluster size is twofold.
First, it ensures a control overhead ranging about log(nn) at each node. Second,
the length of the path used for delivering notiﬁcations, and hence the related
delay, is bounded by o log(nn). In order to prevent a cluster of size k from
changing continuously its conﬁguration whenever it gains or looses a member,
the admitted bounded-size of a cluster ranges from k up to 2k cluster members.
In practice, to warrant a loop-free structure, each node belongs to the lowest layer
(L0) and only the leader of cluster located in a layer Li belongs to the upper
layer Li+1. This delivery structure is created and maintained by a grouping
solution. Considering the fact that there exists no unique grouping protocol
that is optimal for any kind of network, we use a specialised grouping solutions
for each type of network along with a mechanism for integrating them. We
Layer L 0
Layer L 1
Layer L
2 B
A
A C
AB C
A
Layer L 3
Cluster
Logical topology
B
C
Fig. 3. Event Delivery Structure
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rely on the Nice protocol [3] which has been speciﬁcally designed for operating
in infrastructure-based large-scale network (e.g., the Internet) and the Madeira
protocol that comes from our previous research on network management [10] and
is customised to operating over ad hoc networks. The reason that motivates our
choice for the Nice protocol, is twofold. First, this application-level protocol can
operate over a large-scale network spanning diﬀerent administrative domains.
In addition, it were originally developed to support video streaming and hence
meets the requirements driven by real-time delivery.
For scalability reasons, a node does not manage information concerning the
overall group. Instead, a member or cluster head maintains information restricted
to its cluster(s); each member sending periodically a keep-alive message. This
limited knowledge permits to keep to a minimum the number of control messages
exchanged for maintaining up-to-date membership information.
3.4 Distributed Service Discovery
The resource constraints of networked devices (e.g., routers, or devices belonging
to ad hoc networks) coupled with the ﬁnancial cost inherent to the deployment of
additional functionalities on devices, circumvents the need for enabling HDSOC
to delegate to remote devices a part of the functionalities relating to intrusion
detection, e.g., log parsing and signature matching. The eﬀective delegation of
these functionalities, which are traditionally performed by ECBoxes, necessitates
to discover on the ﬂy the service(s) oﬀered in the network that best match(es)
these functionalities requirements. The following introduces a service discovery
protocol [11] that meets this requirement. This protocol is aimed at hybrid net-
works including ad hoc networks. In the ad hoc network, our primary goal is
to keep to a minimum the traﬃc generated by the service discovery process, so
as to minimise consumption of resources and in particular energy. Speciﬁcally,
our discovery architecture is structured around a subset of HDSOC nodes, called
lookup agents or simply agents, that are responsible for discovering ECBox func-
tionalities and capabilities (see Figure 4). These lookup agents are deployed so
that at least one lookup agent is reachable in at most a ﬁxed number of hops,
H, whose value is dependent upon the nodes density. Agents cache the descrip-
tions of ECBoxes’ functionalities (services) available in their vicinity which is
deﬁned by H. Hence, HDSOC nodes (excluding lookup agents) do not have to
maintain a cache of service descriptions, and the network is not ﬂooded by ser-
vice advertisements. A resource-constrained HDSOC device looking for a service
(i.e., an ECBox or one of its embedded functionality), simply sends a query to
the lookup agent for local service discovery. If the description of the requested
service is not cached by the local agent, this agent selectively forwards the query
to other lookup agents so as to perform global discovery. The selection of the
lookup agents toward which service queries are forwarded, is based on the ex-
change of proﬁles among agents. The agent proﬁle provides a compact summary
of the agent’s content and a characterisation of the host capacity. Agent proﬁles
A Security Supervision System for Hybrid Networks 147
Lookup agent
Lookup agent
Lookup agent
Ad hoc
network
Wired 
network Lookup agent
Lookup agent
Logical topology 
H
        =  2 hops
gateway
Fig. 4. Discovery Structure
allow both guaranteeing that service queries are issued to agents that are likely
to cache the description of the requested service and to keep to a minimum the
generated traﬃc. Another critical issue lies in providing convenient features so
as to enable discovery of services over the hybrid network. This is supported
through gateways that (i) advertise their capabilities (e.g., with a related gate-
way protocol, a zeroconf protocol, or using our protocol), and (ii) are assigned
a local or remote lookup agent, implementing the cooperative behaviour as dis-
cussed above. A gateway lookup agent then holds the description of services
available in all the networks composing the hybrid network, and advertises it-
self to the networks it bridges composing the hybrid network. Furthermore, to
support service discovery in an infrastructure-based network in which a network
administrator deploys agents, clients and service providers behave diﬀerently.
Since clients and service providers do not need to elect a agents, they can listen
for agents announcements or rely on the DHCP protocol.
Using this service discovery protocol, a resource-constrained DHSOC device
can delegate to a remote device the resource-consuming functionalities that
implement intrusion detection. For this purpose, it discovers dynamically the
ECBoxes, located within the overall hybrid network, which oﬀer the function-
alities that best match its requirements. Then, it cooperates with the selected
ECBoxe’s service, utilising the provided service description, so as to contribute
to the global eﬀort for detecting intrusions.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a Hybrid Distributed Security Operation Center (HD-
SOC) which collects logs that are generated by any application/service, layer
of the protocol stack or resource (e.g., router), providing a global view of the
supervised system based on which it complex and distributed intrusions can
be detected. Rather than directly transmitting these logs over the network,
causing its overload, logs are parsed in an early stage so as to easily extract
intrusion-related information and distribute it by the mean of compact event
notiﬁcations and alarms. This HDSOC couples a lightweight distributed intru-
sion detection components with a distributed event system and a distributed
service discovery protocol for an eﬃcient delegation of resource-consuming tasks
and a bandwidth-saving cluster-based collection of the events across the hybrid
network. Our Hybrid Distributed Security Operation Center further addresses
the main commitments of hybrid networks: scalability, ﬂexibility, autonomy, and
fault-tolerance. More precisely,
• Scalability comes from the distribution of load relating to the log parsing and
the intrusion detection, on the devices
• Autonomy is the consequence of using a group based event notiﬁcation ser-
vice and a discovery protocol that are (i) automatically deployed without
requiring human intervention and (ii) adapt dynamically to network changes
(e.g., topology changes).
• Fault-tolerance is attributed to (i) a loosely-distributed event delivery that
adapts dynamically to any permanent or transient network failure and a
service discovery protocol that permits to discover dynamically an alternative
to a faulty service.
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